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Abstract: This article focuses on a key episode in the Czech political-economic
history of the 1990s, the abandonment of 'Czech capitalism', and the switch
towards the competition state and an economic model based on foreign in-
vestment. The account of the U-turn in the policy approach to foreign inves-
tors identifies domestic actors that have had a crucial role in organising politi-
cal support for the competition state. These actors, which the author calls the
'comprador' service sector, have an important role in mediating the structural
power of transnational investors and translating it into other forms of power
within the state. These actors also had a major role in shaping the U-turn in
policy in the Czech Republic.
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On 29 April 1998, the Czech Republic rolled out the most generous investment
scheme yet seen among the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). This
ignited a race for greenfield investors in the Visegrád Four region (V4). The Czech
policy U-turn was followed by a reinvention of the investment scheme in Hun-
gary and by the introduction of investment schemes in Poland and Slovakia [Gan-
dullia 2004: 15-16; C. Jensen 2006]. The Czech U-turn in its relation to foreign
investors marked a moment of convergence of state strategies in the region. States
became increasingly internationalised, forging economic globalisation by facili-
tating capital accumulation for transnational investors. After the attempts to pro-
mote national capitalisms failed in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and - to a lesser
extent - in Poland, the attraction of foreign direct investment has become a prior-
ity throughout the region [Bohle 2002; Bohle and Greskovits 2006]. While inter-
nally oriented state strategies dominated policy making in the CEE throughout
the 1990s, by the end of the decade, state economic strategies converged towards
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different models of the competition state. The V4 developed a specific model of
the competition state, aimed at attracting strategic foreign direct investment (EDI)
through targeted subsidies [see Drahokoupil 2007].
This article focuses on a key episode in Czech political-economic history,
the abandonment of 'Czech capitalism' [Myant 2003], and the switch towards the
competition state and an EDI-oriented accumulation. The account of the policy
U-turn identifies domestic actors that have a crucial role in organising polifical
support for the competition state. These actors, which I call the 'comprador' serv-
ice sector, have an important role in mediating the structural power of transna-
tional investors and translating it into other forms of power within the state.' The
political analysis in this article also deconstructs common misconceptions about
the political support for the competition state. It shows that the competition state
has broad social support that goes beyond party divisions, even though it is often
politicised along party lines.
Why and how did the Czech Republic reconsider its policy towards for-
eign investors? And, what is perhaps more puzzling, why did it introduce an
approach favourable to foreign investors only in the late 1990s? Existing literature
on the region offers a number of ways to look at the problem. First, the 'transitol-
ogy' literature that dominated the academic mainstream in the aftermath of 1989
has attributed analytic primacy to internal determination of the post-communist
transformation. This rationale leads us to investigate the domestic determina-
tion of policy pathways. Respective analyses then focused on domestic actors,
networks, projects, and constraints [Stark and Bruszt 1998; Dobry 2000; see Bohle
2000]. Second, the 'transitology' literature was later criticised by neo-Gramscian
scholars who emphasised the centrality of the global context of transition and
underscored its external determination. This paradigm then identified foreign
investors and their domestic allies as the major actors in an environment with
weak domestic social forces, most notably capital and labour [Bohle 2002; Hol-
man 1998, 2004; Shields 2003, 2004; van der Pijl 2001]. Einally, from an economic
sociology perspective, Bandelj [2007] has pointed out the importance of social
and cultural ties between host and home countries and the embeddedness of in-
vestors in social structures, cultural understandings, and power relations.
I argue that the belief in the importance of the international political-eco-
nomic envirorunent for transition strategies, which led initially to false predic-
tions about the prominence of EDI in the post-communist transition, was ulti-
mately not mistaken. The international environment in which transition and
post-transition policy-making took place indeed had a crucial role in explaining
final outcomes. But there is a missing link. The pressures of the transnational
environment had first to be translated, embodied, and expressed by key actors in
domestic politics and within the state.
' As explained in detail below, 'comprador' refers to a structural link of the sector with
transnational capital.
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My analysis below will show that domestic politics plays a crucial role in
this process. Domestic politics, however, cannot be understood as completely in-
ternally determined. It must be treated as an instantiation of locally materialising
transnational processes. Domestic politics understood as transnationally consti-
tuted allows comprehension of both the initial inward-oriented outcomes and
the later shift towards the competition state. Theoretically, this article draws on
a strategic-relational state theoretical perspective Isee Drahokoupil, Van Apel-
doorn and Horn 2008]. Accordingly, the structure and organisation of the econ-
omy, institutions, and ideas have a major role in constituting social forces and
in mediating their relative power and social influence. These structural features
produce a 'fleld of force' [cf. Kalb 1997] that exerts pressures and sets limits on
what is achievable. In other words, they constitute a (strategically-selective) envi-
ronment that provides advantages to some actors and strategies over others. Yet,
actual outcomes are produced by strategic actors in social struggles, in the trans-
nationally constituted domestic politics, some structural opportunities are en-
acted - or some social mechanisms are activated - while other are suppressed or
muted. Combining political economy and politicai analysis creates an approach
that complements and goes beyond Bandelj's economic sociology perspective. It
identifies actors pursuing their interests, which reduces the degree of contingen-
cy in what the economic sociology approach depicts (merely as) culturally and
socially embedded strategies. It also uncovers the power relations overlooked by
such an approach by analysing the structural power inscribed in the political and
economic environment and the processes whereby it was translated into actual
outcomes. This kind of political analysis complements the alternative approach
based on regression models. The latter makes it possible to assess the influence
of individual factors in a more formal and systematic way, yet it is susceptible to
impressionist and at times misleading interpretations of actual political strategies
(see my review of Bandelj on the pages of this journal. Vol. 44 (6): 1224-1228).
Below I first present my interpretation of the comprador service sector as
a force that mediates the structural power of transnational capital and organises
the political support for the competihon state. Second, 1 outline the struggle in
the early 1990s that gave rise to the 'Czech way', despite the fact that the interna-
tional political-economic environment provided advantages to the competing ex-
ternally-oriented project. Finally, 1 analyse the policy U-turn in which the Czech
state reconsidered its approach to FDI and introduced targeted investment subsi-
dies. In particular, 1 identify the strategic role of the comprador service sector in
this move and also the role of other actors, including the EU and multinational
investors. Publicly unavailable data were collected through archival research and
qualitative interviews with key policy makers, politicians, and business elites [see
DrahokoupU 2008].
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The structural power of the multinationals and the strategic role
of the comprador service sector
The literature on (FDI-)dependent development has emphasised the crucial role
of domestic actors in the political coalitions that underpinned the projects of de-
velopment relying on FDI in global peripheries. Poulantzas used the term 'com-
prador bourgeoisie' to describe the underlying class relations. The comprador
bourgeoisie was defined as 'that fraction whose interests are entirely subordi-
nated to those of foreign capital, and which functions as a kind of staging-post
and direct intermediary for the implantation and reproduction of foreign capital'
[Poulantzas 1976: 42; cf. Baran 1957]. in CEE, Eyal, Szelényi and Townsley [1998:
Chapter 5] identified foreign investors with their comprador intellectual allies as
one of the major candidates for a new propertied class. Holman argued that the
new power elites in the region cannot be characterised as a propertied compra-
dor bourgeoisie, but rather as managerial and administrative elites that have the
same function as that of the comprador bourgeoisie [Holman 2004: 223]. Lane
proposed that a transnational political class, an alliance between internal elites
and external global political class in particular, was a crucial agent of change in
CEE in the 1990s, which effectively precluded the development of social demo-
cratic or corporatist forms of national capitalism [Lane 2005, 2006]. Erom an elite
perspective, Machonin, Tucek and Nekola [2006] observed that the influence of
domestic elites is limited by an 'apparent hegemony of foreign capital'. They ar-
gued that the influence of local managers working for foreign affiliates is based
not on wealth, but on a 'mandate from abroad'. However, the comprador seg-
ments are not sufficiently specified in these accounts. Holman and Lane offer an
analytic understanding; yet they do not identify differences between domestic
elites in their approach to FDI and fail to distinguish between the limited impor-
tance of FDI in the early 1990s and its hegemonic role later in the decade.
I describe the domestic actors linked to FDI as the comprador service sec-
tor, which comprises various groups providing services to foreign investors. It
includes local branches of global consulting and legal advisory service firms and
their local competitors, companies providing other services to foreign investors,
and officials from FDI-related state bodies. Structurally, this sector is not a bour-
geoisie, as it constitutes neither a propertied class, nor a professional manage-
rial class whose interests are directly linked to that of company owners. For this
reason, I prefer to call them a service sector rather than bourgeoisie. Yet, recent
trends, most notably the emergence of regional developers such as the IPEC
Group-, indicate processes of embourgeoisement within this sector. Without im-
plying any value judgement, I refer to this group as comprador, as it is defined
by its structural cormection/link to transnational capital. From a more agent-ori-
ented perspective, this group could largely be seen as an 'epistemic community'
[Haas 1992] or 'institutional entrepreneurs' [DiMaggio 1988]. However, such an
See www.ipec-group.com.
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approach would ignore the importance of the 'social relations of production' (like
in Marx) and of the Weberian 'market situation' in consfituting this group. In
particular, it would overlook the importance of the structural connection/link
to transnational capital and foreign-oriented economic model (or accumula-
tion strategy) in the formation of the interests and strategies of this group. The
structural link to the structural power of capital provides an important source
of power for this sector. A 'market situation' in which service providers could
charge foreign investors fees in excess of the local market average represented an
important pull factor that united and consolidated the comprador service sector.
Thus, the group was not installed by foreign capital to work on its behalf. Instead,
it took shape in the process in which domestic actors were seeking linkages with
foreign investors, as soon as the structure of opportunities created such possibili-
ties. The comprador is thus not an essentialist feature of a group: it is a class posi-
tion created by the changing structure of opportunities and political-economic
relations that - given the accompanying 'market situation' - attracts people with
the necessary skills (including those who previously supported the national, in-
ward-oriented project).
The structural power of capital derives from the dependency of the state and
society at large on the investment decisions of those who control key productive
factors (e.g. the possibility of investment strike and state revenue dependence).^
Capital mobility has greatly increased the power of transnational investors, as
they are able to locate their investment outlets in the regulatory environment of
their choice and have the possibility of exit (at varying relocation costs). In CEE,
the neo-liberal transition strategies greatly facilitated the structural power of trans-
national investors as they abolished the Comecon* markets and opened the do-
mestic economies to global competition [Boer-Ashworth 2000]. CEE economies
specialising within the Comecon in complex sectors [see, e.g., Berend 1996] were
not able to compete on the world market and had to downgrade and diversify their
production profiles in order to be able to sell there [see Myant 2003]. Multinafional
enterprises rather than domestic companies controlled the necessary know-how
and distributional networks and were thus major agents of enterprise revival and
réintégration of CEE into the world market [Myant and Drahokoupil 2010].
But the structural power of capital does not predetermine a single outcome;
nor does it predetermine a single policy even in economies as highly depend-
ent on FDI as those in the V4. The cumulative empirical evidence contradicts
the trade-off between redistribution and investment implied in the 'structural
dependency' thesis as formulated by Przeworski and Wallerstein [1988]. Eirst, a
variety of domestic political-economic strategies can be competitive in the inter-
^ See, inter alia, Hirschman [1970]; Przeworski and Wallerstein [1988]; Offe and Ronge
[1975]; Gough [1979]. For a detailed discussion of the structural and agency power of capi-
tal, see Gill and Law [1989] and Farnsworth [2004].
^ The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) was disbanded at the final
council session on 28 June 1991 in Budapest.
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national economy, including those relying on high spending and taxation [Hall
and Soskice 2001; Rodrik 1997]. Second, physical and human capital endowments
can facilitate the pursuit of policies that are against the immediate interests of
capital even in a very open economy [Shafer 1994; Gereffi 1995]. Third, research
on the actual locational decisions of multinationals has shown that these tend to
be determined primarily by proximity and market access and by the skills and
educational attainment levels of the host economy's workforce; there is no evi-
dence that the degree of market regulation or non-wage labour costs suppress
the level of inward investment [Cooke and Noble 1998; Cooke 2001]. Given that
the structural constraints facilitate a wider variety of policies (at least from the
perspective of advanced capitalist countries), the discursive constitution of what
is possible, or what the markets and investors 'really want', becomes often more
important and limiting than the actual 'hard' constraints [Watson and Hay 2003].
In this context, the political activities of the comprador service sector had a major
role in actively contributing to the discursive construction of the constraints and
limits of the political economic environment and the imperatives of capital mobil-
ity in particular.
Capital mobility, however, constrains the autonomy of policy makers in the
V4 region, as many investors regard the region as a single investment location,
with EU market proximity, good institutional infrastructure, and a comparable
workforce and labour costs. This puts structural pressures on policies that are
deemed important for the investors. It also allows investors to arbitrage locations
in order to get additional benefits in the form of investment subsidies. This can
make some cost considerations that are generally marginal in location decision
an important factor. In the context of the early stage of FDI inflows addressed in
this article, the avoidance of political risks that increase the costs of internation-
alisation was one of the major concerns for the multinationals. The latter face
significant disinvestment costs once invested in a foreign market. As a risk man-
agement strategy, investors tend to seek explicit commitments to FDI-friendly
policies that can be used as a political 'stick' against policies that may represent
an 'expropriation of [expected] revenue streams' [N. M. Jensen 2003]. From the
perspective of many investors and their advisers in the early 1990s (including
those I interviewed), such commitment was missing from the Czech Republic.
The introduction of the investment scheme package was a signal to investors that
the Czech Republic was open for their business.
Functionally, the comprador service sector is a nodal point and organiser
of the transnational power bloc centred on multinational investors. These com-
prador blocs also include significant fractions of domestic capital, which are
becoming largely interna Honalised and/or subordinated to international inves-
tors. The comprador sector constitutes an important link between investors and
states, which is missing from the state-investor bargaining models that dominate
the scholarship on FDI and the power of capital in general [e.g. Przeworski and
Wallerstein 1988; N. M. Jensen 2003; Meyer and Jensen 2005]. Governments are
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not social actors independent of other social forces, including investors. The actu-
al policy outcomes are products of the agency of particular social forces mediated
through structures of representation inscribed in the state. In this spirit, Bohle
and Husz [2005] pointed to the congruence of interests between the investors
and national elites in the V4. To be more precise, I argue that it is the privileged
position that social forces connected to FDI gained within respective states that
explains the support for EDI promotion and the competition state in general. The
comprador service sector helps to translate the structural power of transnational
capital into tactical forms of power that enable agential power to work in sync
with the interests of the multinationals. The notion of tactical power introduces
an intermediate level between the structural and agential faces of power. Tactical
power, or what others call agenda-setting power [see Hay 2002: 174-178], refers
to the ability to control the settings of interaction or the respective field of force
[Wolf 1990]. It enables the structural power to work in sync with its agential coun-
terpart.
Power through agency is exercised by direct participation of business with-
in and in relation to the state institutions. The particular channels of representa-
tion that the comprador service sector and foreign investors organised and took
advantage of are analysed below. As mentioned above, the success of these activi-
ties cannot be attributed to the strategy of the comprador sector alone, but rather
to its cormection/link to the structural power of the investors (power through
agency). They could thus offer carrots in the form of political capital from job
creation and imports of the sophisticated technology associated with greenfield
investment by multinationals. The (perceived) risk of an investor deciding not to
invest in the country because of a lack of EDI-friendly policies then represented a
political 'stick' the sector could use. In the Czech context these 'carrots and sticks'
have become particularly effective in times of crisis, when the failure of the alter-
native, internally oriented accumulation strategy becames apparent.
As noted above, strategic agency can have a crucial role in shaping the un-
derstanding of the international polifical-economic imperatives. The tactical, or
agenda-setting, strategies pursued by the comprador service sector often facilitat-
ed the learning process in which policy makers came to understand the impera-
Hves of the structural power of multinationals. In the Czech Republic, where the
internally oriented model and the reluctance to implement EDI-friendly policies
became particularly entrenched, the comprador service sector became especially
organised and implemented a number of activities aimed at redefining the ap-
proach of policy makers to EDI. It thus taught lessons on the importance of for-
eign investors for the domestic economy and on the need to implement policies
that would favour them.
At the same time, however, the strategic role of the comprador service sector
should not be overesfimated. While they had a major role in redefining the ap-
proach to FDI in general, their specific role in policy design was largely limited to
defining the competition strategy based on attracting investors through targeted
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subsidies. A comprehensive understanding of the Czech path of adjustment to
internañonal political-economic pressures, including the transformation of social
policies and the welfare state, would also have to take into account the strategic
agency of other forces, including domestic capital and labour and their interplay
with various path dependencies and structural and institutional endowments
[see, e.g., Bohle and Greskovits 2007; Drahokoupil 2009]. This analysis focuses
only on the shift in the approach to FDI in general and on the narrow area of
industrial policy.
The early 1990s: the 'Czech way' against the odds
There were good reasons to expect foreign investment to dominate post-com-
munist economic restructuring in CHE. Strategically, reformers in CHE were well
integrated into a transnational policy network where openness to FDI was the
norm. Western politicians and many advisors have seen FDI as a 'Marshall Plan
for Eastern Europe'. USAID-financed investment bankers embarked on a mission
to handle the sale of state-owned enterprises to foreign investors. They had di-
rect access to key decision-makers in Eastern Europe [Meaney 1995]. Structurally,
the neo-liberal strategy of the region's integration into global capitalism or the
'American approach' [Gowan 1995,1996; cf. van der Pijl 2006; 237-242] provided
strategic advantages to FDI-reliant strategies. This doctrine installed political-
economic structures that made the exigencies of global accumulation a political
prerequisite for national strategies in the region. The peripheral mode of integra-
tion on which CEE embarked made the region structurally dependent on foreign
capital [cf. Boer-Ashworth 2000; Bohle 2006]. These structural exigencies repre-
sent the main mechanism that account for the emergence of the competition state
in CEE. However, they were not translated into political outcomes until the end
of the 1990s.
In the early 1990s, state strategies were actually open to foreign direct in-
vestment in Hungary only. The approach to FDI in general and privatisation in
particular has been quite hostile to foreign investors In the rest of the V4. Yet, the
outcome is puzzling only in the Czech case. Only in the Czech Republic were for-
eign investors interested in high-commitment involvement, while state managers
controlled enterprises and could have transferred them to foreign investors if they
wished.^ The structural constraints did not allow for open outcomes elsewhere.
^ The bulk of enterprises were privatised through privatisation projects submitted by en-
terprise managers and the outcomes were often in line with their interests. However, the
privatisation method was decided by the reformers, and managers had to anticipate their
expectations when designing privatisation proposals. There is no evidence that managers
influenced the method of privatisation; on the contrary, research shows that they had very
little power and agency when the privatisation method was being designed [Orenstein
2001; Gould 2001; Appel 2004].
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First, unlike Himgary and Poland, Czechoslovakia did not inherit significant debt
and thus did not have to subordinate privatisation strategy to obtaining cash in
hard currency as the Hungarians did. Second, unlike in Poland and Slovakia,
foreign investors were interested in taking over the commanding heights of the
Czech economy. Finally, unlike in Poland, effective control over enterprise priva-
tisation lay with Czech policy makers rather than with enterprise insiders.
Czech state strategy was shaped in a struggle between two groups within the
state. The 'industrialists,' on the one hand, advocated a privatisation programme
that would find strategic owners, foreign investors, for main enterprises. Most
notably, Jan Vrba, then Minister of Industry and Trade, believed that only for-
eign investors could provide access to new technologies, know-how, distribuHon
networks, and capital investment. He planned to bring foreign investors to what
he identified as the core of the Czech economy. The externally oriented strategy
had wider support within the ministries. It came mainly from the 'business elite',
that is, bureaucrats linked to enterprise managers. On the other hand, neo-liberal
reformers - who, in contrast to the industrialists, were involved in designing the
general transition strategy - promoted a hands-off, voucher-based privafisation
model. The hands-off model was incompatible with FDI entry, which demanded
an active approach by the state to secure the contractual commitments required
by investors. What is more, the neo-liberals did not favour the parficipation of
foreign investors and preferred the creation of a domestic capitalist class [Kupka
1992; McDermott 2002; Appel 2004]. ,
Vrba offered the leading Czech companies for sale to foreign investors in
June 1991. There were a number of foreign investors ready to bid for the com-
manding heights of the Czech economy. In retrospect, Czech reformers and in-
tellectuals close to Klaus explain the relative absence of foreign investors in the
privafisation of the early 1990s by the lack of interest on the part of foreign inves-
tors."" The historical record, however, suggests that this was not the case. There
was considerable interest among foreign investors to buy out Czech state-owned
enterprises at that time. Vrba and his team managed to put together a list of buy-
ers for what they saw as the commanding heights of the Czech economy. Vrba's
team managed to conclude a number of deals with foreign investors, most no-
tably the transfer of Skoda to Volkswagen. The investors perceived the country
as a prospective production site for exports to the East. Moreover, Volkswagen's
acquisition of Skoda had a 'herding effect', drawing other investors into the re-
gion. The interest of foreign investors in taking part also in the privatisation of
other companies that were actually privatised in the 'Czech way' is confirmed by
various privatisafion records [e.g. Myant 1999; McDermott 2002; Pavlinek 2002].
Box 1 illustrates the situation in the case of lorry manufacturers.
^ See, for instance, the interview with DuSan Tïiska in Profit (a business weekly), 2 May
2006, or Jiíí Schwarz's speech at the Czech-German colloquium 'Reform and Transforma-
tion' in Prague, 6 March 2001, later published as Schwarz [2003].
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Box 1. How Czech truck manufacturers were not sold to foreigners
Lorry production in Czechoslovakia was fragmented, with three major manufactur-
ers: Liaz, Tatra, and Avia. Vrba's Ministry of Industry and Trade favoured a more in-
terventionist approach and reorganised the sector before privatisation. Yet, this statist
strategy was difficult to pursue, as it met resistance from Klaus and his allies as well
as from the management of the manufacturers themselves, which wanted to continue
operating independently. In this context, the Ministry looked for buyers for the indi-
vidual manufacturers. On 9 March 1992, the Wall Street journal reported on the process
as follows: 'Mercedes had to outbid France's Renault S.A. and Iveco, a unit of Italy's
Fiat S.p.A., to snare two major truck companies in Czechoslovakia. A third Czechoslo-
vak truck producer, Tatra, is still being pursued by Western investors. "If we want to
defend our European leadership, then we have to do something in Eastern Europe,"
Mr Werner [of Mercedes' management board] declares.' Mercedes indeed signed let-
ters of intent to take stakes in two major truck companies. Avia and Liaz, in March
1992. Liaz, however, turned down the deal with Mercedes, citing Mercedes' intention
to keep only part of the operation as the reason. Claiming to produce an excellent
truck ideal for rough terrain, Tatra rejected a possible joint venture to assemble Iveco.
Instead, it opted mainly for voucher privatisation, which guaranteed the management
protection from state-led rationalisation across the sector or from a possible sale to a
foreign firm. Vrba linked the management's decision to intervention from Tfi'ska, one
of Klaus's close collaborators, who visited the factory to advise the management to
adopt the voucher model in order to avoid their likely dismissal after Mercedes' entry
(interview by the author, 21 October 2005). Negotiations at Avia were accompanied
by long delays, with Mercedes demanding protection from the domestic market. Mer-
cedes finally pulled out in 1993 without giving any clear explanation as to why.
It was thus the state strategy rather than the lack of interest among the in-
vestors that explained the relative absence of foreign investors in the restructur-
ing of Czech industry in the early 1990s. Crucial in this context was the victory
of the neo-liberals in a path-shaping political struggle that culminated in June
1992 [see Drahokoupil 2008: Chapter 3]. The neo-liberals mobilised enterprise
managers, who feared losing their positions after a foreign takeover, to support
voucher-oriented strategies in individual enterprises. More importantly, they
marginalised the industrialists in a political struggle within the state by playing
on anti-communist sentiment [see Gould 2001; Appel 2004; Drahokoupil 2008].
Many of the investors were thus turned down, especially after Vrba and his team
were pushed out of power. What is more, some of the investors pulled out from
the privatisation negotiations, as Klaus and his team were not willing to allow
the state a more active role in restructuring, which would have guaranteed the
contract commitments sought by the investors [McDermott 2002].
Czech strategy reflected the concerns of local neo-liberals. It prevented the
earlier internationalisation of the commanding heights of the Czech economy and
the emergence of foreign-led capitalism similar to the Hungarian model. Instead,
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the policies actually implemented produced a distinctive economic dynamic,
Czech capitalism, and created a coalition of reform winners that provided politi-
cal support to the internally oriented project. At the same time, the neo-liberal
strategy helped create conditions that offered structural advantages to foreign
investors, which later, when the economic dynamics of Czech capitalism were
exhausted, pushed the state strategy in the externally oriented direction. These
structural conditions - which were largely in place throughout the 1990s ~ were
translated into policy outcomes by the end of the decade.
Crisis-induced internationalisation: the policy turnaround
in the Czech Republic
On 30 November 1997, Prime Minister Klaus handed in his government's resigna-
fion in the wake of a political and economic crisis. The departure of Klaus and
his government marked the dissolution of the Klausian project [see Myant 2003]
and a profound reorientafion of state strategy in relation to foreign investors. The
economic programme of the caretaker government of Josef Toèovsky, who was
su'orn in on 2 January 1998, included the aim of attracting foreign direct invest-
ment. In April 1998, the Toáovsky government introduced a package of invest-
ment incentives with the aim of attracting foreign investment. This policy was
then implemented by the Social Democrats, who took power in June 1998. The
Social Democratic government would make attracting foreign investors a focal
point of its economic strategy. It is often thought that the outward-oriented poli-
cies, FDI incentives in particular, came with the change of government, when the
Klaus-led coalition moved into the opposition [e.g. Orenstein 2001:93]. However,
the historical record shows that the process of policy reorientation had much
broader sources, which were largely independent of party politics. The poUtical
change may have 'radicalised' and catalysed the pace of the policy change, but
it was not a decisive factor. As will be shown below, the policy U-turn has to be
related to the structural power of transnafional capital, as translated by its domes-
fic allies - the comprador service sector - and amplified by the exhaustion of the
domestic accumulation strategy.
It is often forgotten that it was already the Klaus government, and indeed
Klaus himself, who made the decision to reconsider their hitherto negative ap-
proach to FDI promotion and provide subsidies to foreign investors in 1997. This
contradicts the party-pluralist explanation. The history of the outward-oriented
project, however, goes further back in time. It was already being developed within
the state at the time when the Klausian inwardly oriented strategy was dominant.
There was a group within the state that had been actively working on the promo-
tion of FDI. Located at the Department of Industry and Trade, these bureaucrats
- a state fraction of the comprador service sector - faced a hostile environment.
Nevertheless, they managed to thrive. In November 1992, they founded a for-
eign investment promotion agency: Czechlnvest - at that time called the Czech
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Source: MIGA-FIAS (2005). It is important to note that some of the assistance received
was free of charge and not reflected in the budget. The approximate annual exchange
rates used are: 1 USD = 27 CZK (1993-1996); 1 USD = 33 CZK (1997); 1 USD = 30 CZK
(1998); 1 USD = 34.64 CZK (1999); 1 USD = 38.59 CZK (2000);l USD = 38.04 CZK (2001);
1 USD = 33.3 CZK (2002). This table reflects some rounding of the decimal places.
Agency for Eoreign Investment. As recalled by Vladimir Dlouhf, then Minister of
Industry and Trade, a Phare-financed Irish advisor had a crucial role in persuad-
ing Dlouhy of the utility and necessity of having such an agency.' The EU's finan-
cial support was vital for the agency in the years that followed. The EU not only
financed advisors that used Irish experience to make the case for the existence of
an investment promotion agency, but also provided a crucial source of funding.
Ireland was perceived as the first European tiger to emerge and transform its
semi-peripheral location to make it an export-led 'climber' within the interna-
tional hierarchy [cf. Smith 2005]. Many within the EU apparatus and in the CEE
states saw CEE as Ireland's natural successor. The region was meant to replicate
the 'Celtic tiger' experience within the EU.
As Table 1 shows, external resources covered up to 62% of Czechlnvest's
budget in the early 1990s. Moreover, some of the aid to Czechlnvest was provided
in kind and was not reflected in Czechlnvest's budget. Jan Havelka, Czechlnvest's
founder and CEO in 1993-1999, very much underscores the importance of foreign
aid for the organisation in the early 1990s. This is refiected in his estimate that
around 80% of Czechlnvest's budget was paid for by foreign taxpayers in some
years of the early 1990s. Havelka, who was recruited by foreign advisors because
of his experience as a project manager at the Kuwait Investment Office and as an
advisor to the Slovak Minister of Eoreign Affairs, explains the importance of the
EU in developing the foreign investment promotion agency in an environment
that was very hostile to such activities:
^ Dlouhy's contribution in Czechlnvest [2002: 8-10].
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[External support was indeed important.] I was supported by people from the World
Bank and the European Commission. Thus, I was able to obtain massive handing
from Phare in the early years, This gave me the image as someone who knew what
he wanted in the eyes of [Minister of Industry and Trade] Dlouhy. I had the confi-
dence of people who [the Minister] trusted. |...] After I persuaded Dlouhy, I could
afford such escapades as arranging - behind the back of the Ministry - permanent
representations abroad, financed by Phare.*
Faced with a hostile environment both within the government and among
the general public, Havelka's strategy focused on changing the public's percep-
tion of foreign investment and winning the government's trust and gaining its
support. In order to change the perception among state officials and to make al-
lies among them, Czechlnvest used its Steering Committee, which included rep-
resentatives of other government institutions, the private sector, and banks, who
were appointed by the Minister of Industry and Trade. Czechlnvest employed
internal public relations efforts to win over the understanding and trust of the
government and especially the Ministry of Industry and Trade. For instance,
Czechlnvest invited government officials on study tours and remembered their
birthdays and other personal events. To convince the public of the potential ben-
efits of FDI, Czechlnvest showcased the posiäve experiences of other countries
and promoted the agency and its efforts through constant press releases. The
agency needed to show quick results in order to demonstrate the positive im-
pact of FDI. 'Greenfield' projects were found suitable for these purposes. Thus,
it focused on attracting greenfield manufacturing investments in the automotive,
electronics, and precision engineering sectors. Such investment projects were re-
garded as having great potential to create good publicity through job creation,
which also represented an important source of political capital that could be of-
fered to politicians. These projects also fitted with the common belief about the
traditional strength of Czechs in the area of manufacturings their technical skills,
and the country's trained labour force.
In 1996, Czechlnvest established the Association of Foreign Investors (AFI)
to serve as an official body representing the interests of investors to the gov-
ernment and to link local service providers with foreign investors. Apart from
its business function, AFI proved to be an important vehicle for soliciting and
channelling investors' concerns to the government, and it helped Czechlnvest
to finance activities aimed at promoting investment-friendly policies within the
government. AFI funds represented 5-10% of Czechlnvest's total funding. AFI's
activities were aimed at building a 'working relationship' between investors and
the government. They include breakfast meetings, unofficial meetings with min-
isters, unofficial contacts with investors, and the AFl/Czechlnvest-sponsored an-
nual awards such as Best Investor, Most Successful Industrial Zone, and Most
Successful Supplier. AFI and Czechlnvest also initiated working groups on a
Interview with Jan Havelka, Prague, 30 December 2005.
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number of issues, including labour law, tax accounting, residency issues, and
real estate development.
However, these attempts to set the agenda and create channels of represen-
tation to exercise agency-power had only limited success throughout the mid-
1990s. The government was refusing to provide preferential treatment to foreign
investors, as promoted by Czechlnvest. This had some apparent consequences
as far as investors' locational decisions were concerned. Petr Hájek, working at
Czechlnvest at that time, illustrates this with the example of a situation where a
Japanese corporation asked for an import duty waiver on machinery it was going
to import for its production plant. Klaus rejected the deal and the investor went to
another country where it was able to receive such concessions. The turning point
came in 1997 when Intel and General Motors (GM) were looking for investment
sites in Europe and explored possibilities in the Czech Republic. According to
Havelka, Klaus became interested as he favoured American investors. Czechln-
vest used their familiar line that the Czech Republic was not competitive without
investment subsidies, which were provided by direct competitors, most notably
Hungary. In contrast, Klaus believed in the country's natural comparative advan-
tages. Yet, the negotiations with Intel and GM demonstrated the importance of
'non-natural' factors.
The combination of these hard lessons, a mounting economic crisis, and the
fact that the Czech Republic was a regional laggard in terms of FDI inflows made
the Klaus government reconsider its approach to foreign investors (see the time-
line in Table 2). When the limits of internally oriented accumulation - the 'Czech
way' - became apparent, the only alternative seemed to be the externally oriented
approach. The agenda-setting activities of the comprador service sector not only
helped to construct such an understanding, but also offered an easy policy so-
lution at a time of crisis: investment incentives. Under these circumstances, the
sector could capitalise on their connection/link to foreign investors and translate
their structural power into political capital, giving the comprador service sec-
tor a privileged position in Czech policy making. This lent the agenda-setting
activities and channels of representation the sector had organised considerable
potential for political influence.
The year 1997 saw a drop in private investment, which derailed the bal-
anced-budget policy. Rising consumer demand started to inflate labour costs and
stimulated imports. The current account swung into deficit [see Myant 2003]. In
April 1997, the government reacted to the growing budget deficit, the pressure
on the currency, and IMF criticism with an emergency 'package' of budget cuts.
With key economic ministers resigning from the government, currency specu-
lation led to another 'package' of emergency measures in May 1997. In August
1997, the government offered Intel a package of subsidies, as it had demanded.
In November 1997, just a few days before its resignation, it offered a similar pack-
age to GM. As a part of the 'little packages' released in response to the economic
crisis, Klaus assigned the Minister of Industry and Trade with the task of drafting
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an investment-incentives scheme. However, political developments did not allow
Klaus's team to vote on the proposal from the Ministry. Thus, it was the Toëovsky
government that approved the investment support scheme in April 1998.
Witnessing the many failures of domestic enterprises privatised with the
voucher method or in the 'Czech way', most Czech economists began to per-
ceive foreign capital as a major opportunity to stimulate economic development.
Moreover, by the mid-1990s, various 'economic experts', mostly young econo-
mists working at investment banks or finance consulting companies, established
prominence in media discourse. They not only emphasised the need to attract
foreign capital, but also called for the introduction of investment subsidies. At the
same time, Czechlnvest's PR efforts proved to be successful, and Czechlnvest's
experts often commented publicly on FDI-relevant issues and emphasised the
need for an investment support scheme.^ Thus, when the decision to introduce
an investment support scheme was reported in the media, it was accompanied by
praise from established commentators.'"
Investment incentives, however, became a poUtical issue, structured along
party lines, with ODS being critical of the scheme and the Social Democrats
(CSSD) embracing investment support. This gave rise to the impression that in-
vestment support actually came with the new government. The leader of ODS's
MPs, Vlastimil Tlusty, expressed strong disagreement with the investment scheme
proposed by the Toèovsky government, despite the fact that the caretaker gov-
ernment presented the policy as a continuation of measures included in Klaus's
'small packages' of reforms. In contrast, the leader of the Social Democrats, Miloá
Zeman, welcomed the decision of the provisional government, stating that it in
a way draws on the programme of the Social Democratic Party. He claimed that
the Social Democratic Party would continue to develop its policy if they won the
elections." The project to attract FDI, and the investment incentives in particular,
came to be perceived as a Social Democratic project. The opposition ODS would
very much use this interpretative framework in its attacks on the Social Demo-
crats and their policies. CSSD would reinforce this interpretation to demonstrate
the successes of its economic poUcy.
By 1997, there was indeed an impUcit consensus within the Social Dem-
ocratic Party about the desirability of foreign investment support. A group of
economists around former Minister of Industry and Trade, Jan Vrba, which in-
cluded Jan Mládek, Pavel Merth'k, and Jifi Havel, represented the main propo-
nents of such a strategy. They were assigned to develop industrial policy for the
party. However, in the time leading up to the elections, there were also quite vo-
cal nationalistic statements, making references, for ir\stance, to the 'family silver/
^ E.g. 'Chybi investiíní pobídky, tvrdí analytici' (Analysts: Investment Incentives Are
Lacking), Lidové noviny, 1 October 1997.
'" E.g. 'Viada dala najevo, ie stojí o cizf capital' (The Government Made Clear It Is Inter-
ested in Foreign Capital), M/ínío/roíiífl Dnes, 30 April 1998.
" 'Kabinet vyraznè podpoíil cizí i domácí investory' (Cabinet Strongly Supported Foreign
Investors), Profit, 4 May 1998.
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coming from parts of the ranks of the Social Democrats. It was understood that
Miroslav Grégr, former manager of the state-owned enterprise Desta and a major
adversary of Vrba within CSSD, was the main proponent of economic national-
ism in ¿SSD.'^ Havelka recalls a situation where he was attacked by Grégr at a
parliamentary committee for bringing compefitors into good Czech enterprises.
Grégr himself claims that he was in favour of creating Czech capital in the early
1990s. He believed that 'national capitalism' with limited EDI inflow would be
viable if enterprises were restructured by the state before being privatised.
After the elections in July 1998, the Social Democrats came to power. They
made foreign investment support, including the investment-incentives scheme,
the flagship of their economic and industrial policy. This included not only
supporting the incentives scheme, but also relying on foreign investors in the
remaining privafisation cases. The Social Democrats would use the successful
cases of privatisation to foreigners, such as Ôkod a-Volkswagen, as examples that
such a strategy works. Moreover, they could already use the first wave of inves-
tors who were granted investment incentives. The scheme of investment support
was met with great interest from investors. Only one month after it was intro-
duced, Czechlnvest reported there had been 111 applicants. Zeman, as the new
prime minister, took part in the opening ceremony of the Matsushita plant, which
marked the success of the project to attract investment. Eor investors, this was a
sign of the new government's strong commitment to the investment-incentives
scheme. Eor Czechlnvest, which was put in a posifion of uncertainty after Grégr
became the Minister of Industry and Trade, it became clear that it would find
strong political support within the government. Indeed, Grégr jumped on the
bandwagon of foreign investment support.
After the elections in 2006, ODS formed the government. One of the most
vocal critics of the investment incentives scheme, Martin Riman (ODS), became
the Minister of Industry and Trade. Based on the bold statements of ODS politi-
cians in the Opposition, there were many reasons to expect a scaling down of the
investment schemes. Shortly after foman took the post, he introduced an amend-
ment to the law on investment incentives, which he presented as a major change
in approach.'^ In fact, rather than changing the state strategy, this amendment
included retargeting investment support to more technology-intensive activities,
as had actually been planned by the ministry and Czechlnvest before ftiman and
ODS took power. Thus, ODS was implementing an adjustment to the incentives
that would have been made anyway. Therefore, the Social Democrats had no ob-
jections to supporting the amendment in Parliament.'^
'- It must be noted, however, that Grégr participated in the privatisaUon of Skoda to
Volkswagen, which he later very much boasted about.
'^  See 'tóman vyhlásil stop montovnám' (ftíman: Stop Assembly Plants) iHNed.cz, 19 Oc-
tober 2006.
'^  See also I. Drahokoupii, 'Is Czechlnvest Facing Extinction?' Czech Business Weekly. 7 May
2007, http: /www.cbw.cz/phprs/2007050702.html.
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Conclusion: political support for the competition state
The reorientation of Czech industrial policy underscores the importance of struc-
tural pressures in steering state strategies in the direction of competition. Nego-
tiations with investors proved to be key mechanisms for translating the structural
power of transnational capital into policy outcomes. At the same time, the project
of the competition state was promoted within the state by a group of state manag-
ers, the state fraction of the comprador service sector. It organised a coalition of
forces promoting the competition state. Mediated by the activities of this group,
the structural power of capital brought the comprador service sector into a prom-
inent position in domestic politics. The EU provided important support to the
activities of the comprador service sector in the early 1990s. Later, EU regulation
effectively precluded attempts to promote national capitalism. The Czech story
shows that the actual support for the competition state cuts across party lines, the
political rhetoric notwithstanding.
Externally oriented strategies became predominant all across the V4 by 1999.
They have been pursued by governments regardless of the ruling party coalitions
[cf. Bohle 2006]. Political support for the competition state goes beyond narrow
short-term interests and immediate material concessions, as was largely the case
with the national projects of the early 1990s [Drahokoupil 2008: Chapters 3 and 4].
The wide embracement of the competition state has to be related to the structural
environment, which produces a field of force that not only puts constraints on
possible strategies, but also makes the externally oriented strategy a 'comprehen-
sive programme' for societies in the region. These structural features also include
dominant interpretative/ideational frames. In this context, the 'business school
notion of globalisation' - including the assumption of perfect capital mobility
and capital's insistence on pursuing neo-liberal policies - that is popular among
policy makers is particularly important. The structural field of force shapes the
'field of the politically thinkable' [Bourdieu 1984] and thus makes the externally
oriented project not only a positive programme, but also a framework of thinking
that facilitates the articulation of various ideological positions, including resist-
ance, on its own terms. The intellectuals of the competition state can thus defend
investment subsidies even fronü 'a market perspective', according to which the
policy, rather than being a market intervention, actually reflects relafions in the
global market for investment and in particular the excess of demand for FDI over
its supply.
The structural power of multinational capital was crucial for reorienting
state strategy in the Czech Republic. However, contrary to the state-centric un-
derstanding of state-multinational bargaining [Vernon 1998; Eden, Lemway and
Schüler 2005; Meyer and Jensen 2005], implementation of the competition-state
project cannot be understood just as the outcome of the unequal distribufion of
power between foreign investors and governments. As mentioned above, govern-
ments are not social actors independent of other social forces, such as investors
and their allies. As the actual policy outcomes are a product of the agency of
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particular social forces mediated through structures of representation centred on
and within the state, it is the privileged position of social forces connected to FDI,
the comprador service sector in particular, within respective states and societies
that explains the support for the competition agenda.
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